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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
LAURALEE CURTIS, * 
Plaintiff-Appellant, * Case No. 890210-CA 
vs. * 
* 
WILLIAM GREGORY CURTIS, * Argument Priority 
* Classification No. 7 
Defendant-Respondent. * 
BRIEF OF APPELLANT 
JURISDICTION 
The Court of Appeals has appellate jurisdiction over this 
domestic relations matter pursuant to Utah Code Ann., § 78-2a-
3(2)(h). 
NATURE OF PROCEEDING 
This is an appeal from (1) a final Order dismissing the 
Plaintiff's Order to Show Cause in Contempt for failure to return 
the children from visitation, and (2) from a final Order 
enforcing a Mississippi Order which modified custody from the 
already existing Utah Decree of Divorce. 
STATEMENT OF THE ISSUES ON APPEAL 
I. Did the trial court err in hold that Mississippi had 
properly established jurisdiction under the Uniform Child Custody 
Jurisdiction Act (UCCJA)? 
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II. Did the trial court err in finding that Mrs. Curtis' 
personal appearance in the Mississippi litigation transferred 
UCCJA jurisdiction to Mississippi? 
3. Did the trial court err in failing to apply the 
provisions of the Parental Kidnapping Prevention Act (PKPA) in 
resolving the conflicting claims of Utah and Mississippi? 
DETERMINATIVE CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS AND STATE STATUTES 
Utah Code Ann., § 30-3-5(3): 
The court has continuing jurisdiction to make 
subsequent changes or new orders for the support and 
maintenance of the parties, the custody of the children 
and their support, maintenance, health, and dental 
care, or the .distribution of the property as is 
reasonable and necessary. 
The Uniform Child Custody Jurisdiction Act, Utah Code Ann., 
§ 78-45c-l et. seq. 
Parental Kidnapping Prevention Act of 1980, 28 U.S.C.A., 
§ 1738A. 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
A. NATURE OF THE CASE. 
This is an appeal concerning the proper jurisdiction to 
bring a divorce modification on the issue of custody. On January 
12, 1989 Judge Boyd L. Park, from the Fourth Judicial District 
Court, heard proffer of counsel on an objection to the Domestic 
Commissioner's recommendation that Utah had continuing 
jurisdiction over custody and had not relinquished jurisdiction 
to Mississippi and did not recognize the Mississippi Orders. The 
Commissioner ordered that the children not be removed from the 
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state and that if Mr. Curtis came to Utah, he should have only 
supervised visitation. On March 7, 1989 Judge Park reversed the 
Commissioner's recommendation and issued a final Order dismissing 
the Plaintiff's Order to Show Cause in Contempt for failure to 
return the children from visitation and entered an Order 
enforcing the Mississippi Order which modified custody from the 
already existing Utah Decree of Divorce. 
B. COURSE OF THE PROCEEDINGS. 
The Decree of Divorce and Findings of Fact and Conclusions 
of Law were entered pursuant to a stipulation by the parties on 
December 4, 1987 by the Honorable Domestic Commissioner Howard H. 
Maetani of the Fourth Judicial District Court. (R. 66) Just 
over two months later, on February 12, 1988, Mr. Curtis took the 
children for visitation. (R. 406) He went to Mississippi and 
got a protective order against Mrs. Curtis entered on February 
16, 1988 and remained in Mississippi. (R. 379) February 26, 
1988, Mrs. Curtis' attorney in Mississippi filed a Motion to 
Dismiss for lack of jurisdiction which was not ruled on until 
after a hearing conducted February 29 through March 2, 1988. (R. 
258) Both parties were present and represented by counsel in 
Mississippi. (R. 408) At the conclusion of the hearing, a 
protective order was entered against Mrs. Curtis. (R. 258) On 
March 8, 1988 the Court denied Mrs. Curtis' Motion to Dismiss for 
lack of jurisdiction. (R. 258) The Mississippi Court took the 
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Modification of a Foreign Decree under advisement. (R. 258) On 
August 9, 1988, the Mississippi Court took the case from under 
advisement and ruled that Mississippi did not have the proper 
jurisdiction to Modify the Utah Decree of Divorce. (R. 208-213) 
The Mississippi Court ruled that both states could lay claim to 
jurisdiction under the UCCJA, but the terms of the Parental 
Kidnapping Prevention Act made it clear Utah was the state of 
proper jurisdiction. However, they did not dissolve the 
Protective Order. (R. 213) 
When the Mississippi Court ruled they did not have proper 
jurisdiction, but would not return her children because of the 
Protective Order, Mrs. Curtis contacted Legal Services in Utah. 
On August 17, 1988 Mrs. Curtis signed an Affidavit in Support of 
an Order to Show Cause in Contempt for failure to return the 
children from visitation. (R. 259) Because of difficulty in 
locating Mr. Curtis he was not served with the Order to Show 
Cause in Contempt until October. (R. 259, 260) 
On September 23, 1988, Mrs. Curtis' Mississippi counsel 
filed a Motion to Dissolve the Protective Order. (R. 259) On 
October 7, 1988, Mrs. Curtis took the children back to Utah in 
accord with the Utah order that had not been modified and the 
Mississippi petition for modification having been dissolved. (R. 
259) On October 24, 1988, Mr. Curtis filed contempt charges 
against Mrs. Curtis and filed a new Motion to Modify the Decree 
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of Divorce, under the same civil number as the already dismissed 
Petition. (R. 259-260) Because the Mississippi Courts had kept 
the Protective Order in force for eight months, even though the 
Mississippi Courts recognized that they did not initially have 
the authority to modify the Utah Decree, the Mississippi Court 
found that it did have jurisdiction over the children on the new 
Petition to Modify because the children had lived in Mississippi 
for longer than six months, in accordance with one provision in 
the UCCJA. 
On November 10, 1988 the Order to Show Cause in contempt was 
conducted in Utah. Commissioner Maetani ordered that Utah had 
continuing jurisdiction and had not relinquished jurisdiction to 
Mississippi and therefore Utah did not recognize the orders made 
by the Mississippi Courts. (R. 260) Mr. Curtis filed an 
objection to this decision. (R. 377) 
On November 22, 1988 the Mississippi Court issued an order 
requiring Mrs. Curtis to appear. (R. 260) When she did not, the 
court held her in contempt and issued sanctions. 
December 6, 1988, the Mississippi Court ruled on the new 
Petition to Modify the Decree of Divorce that because the 
children had been in Mississippi for over six months, it had 
jurisdiction and the Court awarded Mr. Curtis custody. (R. 261) 
In Utah on January 12, 1989, Judge Park took proffer of 
counsel on Mr. Curtis1 objection to the Domestic Commissioner's 
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recommendation. (R. 377) The Court took the case under 
advisement. (R. 445) 
On approximately January 23, 1989, counsel for Mrs. Curtis 
in Mississippi appealed the decision, which appeal is still 
pending. 
The Utah Court's decision was issued March 7, 1989, and we 
appeal from that decision. (R. 359-364) 
C. DISPOSITION IN THE COURT BELOW. 
On March 7, 1989, Judge Boyd L. Park took the case from 
under advisement and found as follows: 
(a) Mr. Curtis failed to return the children in violation 
of the Utah Decree of Divorce. (R. 347) 
(b) Mrs. Curtis personally appeared and litigated issues in 
Mississippi as well as filed and responded to motions and that 
she had been present and had otherwise entered a general 
appearance in the Chancery Court of Scott County, State of 
Mississippi, and had participated in a three day trial there 
where she had been afforded all constitutional rights available 
to anyone in this country who is involved in litigation. (R. 
350) 
(c) A year after the litigation was initiated in 
Mississippi, and just prior to making this decision that we 
appeal from, Judge Park, pursuant to the language in Coppedge vs. 
Harding, 714 P.2d 1121 (Utah, 1985) conducted an extensive 
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telephone conference with Judge Hunter of the Chancery Court of 
Scott County, State of Mississippi, who presided over the matter 
concerning the merits and procedure of the case. During this 
conference both Courts recognized that the State of Utah and the 
State of Mississippi have adopted the Uniform Child Custody 
Jurisdiction Act, the provisions of which apply equally to both 
states. Both Courts also recognized that only one state—the 
state of continuing jurisdiction—has power to modify a divorce 
decree. Both Courts further adhered to the principle that only 
the state with continuing jurisdiction decides whether to decline 
the exercise of its jurisdiction over the Decree of Divorce. 
Both Courts concluded there can be no concurrent jurisdiction 
between the State of Utah and State of Mississippi and that under 
normal circumstances Utah has continuing jurisdiction to make 
subsequent changes or new orders concerning the custody of 
children when such matters have been previously decided in a Utah 
Decree of Divorce. Both Courts further agreed that the parties 
may avail themselves of another jurisdiction if one party meets 
the residency requirements of that jurisdiction and the other 
party appears for the purpose of hearing the matter on its 
merits. (R. 353-354) 
The Court concluded as a matter of law that: 
(a) The Court was mandated to follow Utah Code Ann., § 30-
3-5 which provides for continuing jurisdiction. (R. 354, 359-360) 
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(b) The purpose of the UCCJA is to present a parent from 
wrongfully taking a child to another state to secure a custody 
change. (R. 354-355, 360) 
(a) The Court concurs with the opinion that the 'clean 
hands doctrine' is incorporated in the UCCJA in that a court 
should refuse to assume jurisdiction to reexamine an out of state 
custody decree when the petitioner has engaged in some 
objectionable scheme to gain physical custody of the child in 
violation of the decree. (R. 355, 360) But there is no finding 
as to which party violated the 'clear hands doctrine.' 
(d) Personal jurisdiction over a Defendant may be obtained 
by making a voluntary appearance after the filing of the action. 
(R. 356, 360-361) 
(e) Seeking affirmative relief changes status from special 
appearance to that of a general appearance. (R. 356, 361-362) 
(f) When Mrs. Curtis entered a personal appearance in 
Mississippi, and participated in the hearing, the result was that 
she made a general appearance and submitted herself to the 
jurisdiction of the Mississippi Court. (R. 357, 362) 
(g) By filing a Motion to Dissolve the Protective Order in 
Mississippi Mrs. Curtis placed herself in Mississippi's 
jurisdiction. (R. 357, 362-363) 
(h) The court found that Mrs. Curtis was not entitled to an 
Order to Show Cause holding Mr. Curtis in contempt, and that Mr. 
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Curtis was entitled to Enforcement of the Mississippi Order. (R. 
358, 363) 
D. STATEMENT OF THE FACTS. 
During the course of the marriage the Respondent had been 
severely physically abusive with the Appellant and the children. 
Psychological reports which were conducted as part of the divorce 
action confirmed the abusive personality profile that Mrs. Curtis 
could testify to and that police reports on incidences of 
domestic violence would support. (R. 282-287) The homestudy 
evaluator suggested that the Defendant get custody of the older 
children because of his concern that if Mr. Curtis had all of the 
children taken from him, that he would resort to carrying out one 
or more of his threats to either kidnap the children or kill the 
whole family. (R. 284) In a supplement to the psychological 
report, written just five months before Mr. Curtis took the 
children to Mississippi, the evaluators revised their opinion 
based on their fear of what Mr. Curtis might do: 
In addition, Lauralee (Mrs. Curtis) made a recent trip 
to Texas with Greg's (Mr. Curtis') approval to bring 
both Jolene and Jason back to Utah. When she arrived 
there with a friend, Linda Moulton, of Preston, Idaho, 
Greg had one of his typical tantrums, bashing in 
Lauraleefs car, physically choking and bruising Linda 
and so on. Greg ended up spending the night in jail 
for disturbing the peace and Lauralee and Linda left, 
bringing only Jolene back to Provo. Jason was afraid 
to come with them because he feared that his dad might 
commit suicide or carry out another of his threats to 
physically harm someone. (emphasis added) 
Given this new information by Jolene and Lauralee it 
would seem that Greg and Lauraleef s patterns are 
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becoming more and more clear, i.e., Lauralee is 
stabilizing her living situation and her emotional 
state, while Greg is deteriorating. I still have a 
legitimate fear that Greg might physically harm himself 
or others, especially if full custody is given to 
Lauralee. Based on their activities, however, of the 
past several months and for the children's welfare, I 
would like to amend any previous recommendation and 
suggest (1) that full custody of all the children be 
granted to Lauralee; or (2) that custody of all the 
children exc£|>t Dale (age 16) be granted to her. It 
appears, at this time, that Dale prefers living with 
his father, although I have not visited with him 
directly. Jolene reports that he is smoking dope and 
is somewhat unruly. Before final custody is granted, an 
interview with Dale is recommended. (R.287) 
It would have been very difficult for Mr. Curtis to go to 
trial with this evaluation. The parties stipulated that the 
three oldest children would be allowed to choose who they wanted 
to reside with, and Mrs. Curtis was to have custody of the four 
youngest children. The two oldest sons initially went with Mr. 
Curtis. 
Just two months after the Decree of Divorce had been 
entered, on February 12, 1988, Mr. Curtis took the children for a 
regularly scheduled weekend visitation. (R. 406) When he picked 
up the children, he briefly spoke with Mrs. Curtis. Mr. Curtis 
had been exercising visitation every other weekend since the 
divorce. He did not mention on this occasion that he intended to 
take the children out of the state for the visitation. (R. 407) 
As Mr. Curtis was driving off with the children, he said 
something to the effect that she 'would get her Valentine's 
.present.' (R.257) This made Mrs. Curtis suspicious and she went 
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to his landlord who told her that his apartment had been cleaned 
out and was empty. (R. 407) Mrs. Curtis went to the police and 
County Attorney and asked for help but was told there was nothing 
they could do until he was late coming back from the visitation. 
(R. 407) Mrs. Curtis had no idea where Mr. Curtis had taken the 
children until about a week later when she received papers in the 
mail indicating that Mr. Curtis had filed for custody under the 
Relief from Domestic Abuse provisions of the Mississippi Statutes 
and a hearing deciding custody was scheduled for February 29, 
1988. (R. 408) This was the first time that Mrs. Curtis knew 
that the children were in Mississippi. When Mrs. Curtis went 
back to the County Attorney's Office, they told her it was 
custodial interference and if Mr. Curtis even came back into Utah 
they would arrest him. Other than that, there was nothing they 
could do. Ironically, later when Mississippi issued a warrant 
for Mrs. Curtis' arrest for taking the children back to Utah, 
even though their own Court admitted they did not have 
jurisdiction, it was Utah County Law Enforcement officers who 
arrested her, and the Utah County Attorney's Office that pressed 
charge against her based on the Mississippi Warrant. 
Mrs. Curtis contacted an attorney in Utah and he advised her 
to appear in Mississippi. Mrs. Curtis contacted Legal Services 
in Mississippi and they agreed to help her try to dismiss the 
case. On February 26, 1988, Mrs. Curtis' counsel in Mississippi 
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had filed a Motion to Dismiss based on improper jurisdiction. 
This motion was not ruled on prior to the scheduled hearing. The 
Court planned to proceed with the litigation, which was conducted 
February 29-March 2, 1988. At the conclusion of the proceeding 
in Mississippi, the Court entered a Protective Order against Mrs. 
Curtis and took the issue of Modification of the Utah Decree 
under advisement. (R. 258) Five months after taking the issue 
under advisement, on August 9, 1988, the Mississippi Court 
decided that did not have jurisdiction to Modify the Utah Decree 
under the Uniform Child Custody Jurisdiction Act and the Parental 
Kidnapping Prevention Act, but the Mississippi Court still did 
not dissolve the Protective Order. (R. 208 - 213) In August of 
1988, Appellant contacted Utah Legal Services in an attempt to 
get relief from the Utah Courts. In August the Appellant signed 
an Affidavit in Support of the Order to Show Cause in Re 
Contempt. Because of difficulties in serving the Respondent, the 
Order to Show Cause was not held until November 10, 1988. (R. 
259, 260) The Order to Show Cause was conducted before Domestic 
Commissioner Howard Maetani who ruled that Utah had not 
relinquished jurisdiction and did not recognize the Mississippi 
Order. (R. 156) Mr. Curtis objected to the Commissioner's 
recommendation and requested a hearing before a judge. (R. 377) 
The rest of the case history is recited under "Course of 
Proceedings" above. 
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SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT 
Mississippi does not have proper jurisdiction under the 
UCCJA. Utah had continuing jurisdiction that had never been 
relinquished. Mississippi's own Court agreed that it did not 
have proper jurisdiction when the Petition to Modify was filed in 
February of 1988. The Mississippi trial court used the Relief 
from Domestic Abuse Statute to keep the children in the state of 
Mississippi through a protective order in effect for one year. 
It violates the purposes of the UCCJA to allow Mississippi to 
claim jurisdiction under the home state provision of the UCCJA 
for the Petition to Modify filed in November of 1988 after 
detaining the children in the State through the use of another 
Statute. 
Mrs. Curtis' personal appearance in Mississippi does not 
establish proper jurisdiction under the UCCJA. Personal 
appearance in a custody case is not the standard for determining 
proper jurisdiction under the UCCJA. The purpose of the UCCJA is 
to set uniform standards for determining the best state to hear 
the custody issues—no where does it indicate that personal 
appearance waives the Court responsibility to look at the bases 
of jurisdiction. 
When two states have conflicting claims to custody, the 
Parental Kidnapping Prevention Act controls, and under its terms 
Utah is the proper forum. By the very terms of the PKPA, it 
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controls in cases of two states with conflicting claims. Utah is 
the only state that meets both prongs of the test. Therefore, it 
would violate the policy of the UCCJA to uphold and enforce the 
Mississippi Order. Utah was and is the proper jurisdiction for a 
divorce modification proceeding. 
ARGUMENT 
I. MISSISSIPPI DID NOT AND DOES NOT NOW HAVE PROPER JURISDICTION 
UNDER THE UCCJA 
A. Utah had continuing jurisdiction that had never been 
relinquished at the time Mississippi entered its Orders. 
The Utah trial court found that Utah retains continuing 
jurisdiction pursuant to Utah Code Ann., § 30-3-5(3): 
The Court has continuing jurisdiction to make 
subsequent changes or new orders for the support and 
maintenance of the parties, the custody of the children 
and their support, maintenance, health, and dental 
care, or the distribution of the property as is 
reasonable and necessary. 
Because Utah had admittedly been the state with the original 
jurisdiction it maintains jurisdiction to make changes in 
custody. Especially since the Utah Court had such recent (the 
Divorce had been final for only 10 weeks) information, including 
psychological evaluations on the parties and their children the 
Utah Court was the only appropriate Court in which to seek a 
modification. 
The Utah Court of Appeals recently affirmed that Utah trial 
courts have continuing jurisdiction after an initial Decree is 
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awarded in Utah. Rawlings v. Weiner, 752 P.2d 1327, (Utah App., 
1988). The facts of this case differ from the Curtis case in 
that the primary issue in Rawlings was visitation, not custody. 
Also in Rawlings both Courts conferred and agreed that Utah was 
the appropriate jurisdiction. A judges conference did not happen 
for over year after the matter was filed in Mississippi. 
Mr. Curtis argues that because there was no action pending 
in Utah at the time he filed in Mississippi, Mississippi had no 
obligation to contact the Utah Courts. The Court refutes this in 
Rawlings. 
In Rawlings the custodial parent moved to another state. 
When the non-custodial parent filed an order to show cause in 
Utah, the custodial parent asked for a transfer of venue. The 
Utah Court denied the transfer of venue and the Court of Appeals 
affirmed the trial court's decision. The Court of Appeals 
recognized that the Utah trial court had continuing jurisdiction 
pursuant to Utah Code Ann., § 30-3-5(3). The analysis of the 
court's holding in response to the custodial parent's argument 
that the state was an inconvenient forum applies directly to the 
Curtis case: 
Only if Utah chooses to relinquish jurisdiction, based 
on the best interests of the children, will such 
jurisdiction transfer. 
The Court then noted in footnote 4: 
It may be argued that jurisdiction may be obtained 
through the emergency provision in section 78-45c-
3(1)(c) as was done in this case. However, accepting 
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such jurisdiction on an emergency basis does not give 
permanent jurisdiction. The court is still required to 
contact the original state Court to determine which 
court is most convenient and best serves the interests 
of the children and the parties. 
According to footnote 4, even if the Mississippi Court was 
acting pursuant to the emergency circumstances provision in 
granting the protective order, the Mississippi Court was still 
required to contact the Utah Court. 
In a concurring opinion in Rawlings, Judge Bench referred to 
the Commissioner's note to Utah Code Ann., § 78-45c-14: 
Courts which render a custody decree normally retain 
continuing jurisdiction to modify the decree under 
local law. Courts in these states have in the past 
often assumed jurisdiction to modify the out-of-state 
decree themselves without regard to the preexisting 
jurisdiction of the other state. In order to achieve 
greater stability of custody arrangements and avoid 
forum shopping, subsection (a) declares that other 
states will defer to the continuing jurisdiction of the 
court of another state as long as that state has 
jurisdiction under the standards of this Act. In other 
words, all petitions for modification are to be 
addressed to the prior state if that state has 
sufficient contact with the case to satisfy § 3. 
Judge Bench concluded: 
At Rawling's request, Washington took emergency 
jurisdiction under UCCJA. On discovering that Utah had 
continuing jurisdiction over custody, Washington 
declined any further jurisdiction under section 14(1). 
That was precisely what should have happened under 
UCCJA. Because Utah had primary jurisdiction over 
custody of the children, I concur in affirming the 
judgment of the trial court. Id. at 1330. 
In the Curtis case, Utah did have sufficient contact with 
the children to satisfy § 3, so the Mississippi Court should have 
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contacted Utah prior to conducting a hearing. Mississippi 
should have declined further jurisdiction as the State of 
Washington did in Rawlings. 
The Utah Supreme Court ruled that a Court must contact the 
original Court in Coppedge v. Harding, 714 P.2d 1121 (Utah, 
1985). In Coppedge the grandparents of the child were the first 
to file and serve from the Oregon Court. There had been no 
previous Utah order, because the child had been born and raised 
in Utah and was voluntarily sent to Oregon. The parents in Utah 
were given poor advice by an attorney not to respond to the 
Oregon petition because they did not have jurisdiction. When the 
parents began to understand that they were about to lose custody 
of the child they had voluntarily sent to Oregon to live with his 
grandparents for the school year, they filed an action in Utah. 
Judge Harding acted in accordance with what seemed a reasonable 
request: Enter a Order allowing the natural parents to be able 
to retain custody of their own child, especially since there were 
no allegations of unfitness. When the grandparents sought the 
writ of mandamus from the Supreme Court, the Court must certainly 
have been sympathetic with the Utah couple and the facts of the 
case. But the Supreme Court understood that if the Uniform Child 
Custody Jurisdiction Act is ever going to have real effect, it is 
essential for a court learning of a prior proceeding in another 
state, to contact the original state. Because Utah did not 
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contact the Oregon Court, the Supreme Court sent a firm message 
to the trial courts: We will not uphold your orders unless you 
comply with the terms of the UCCJA. In the Curtis case, an order 
had been made, Utah made the initial decree and had continuing 
jurisdiction. When Mississippi was made aware of this fact, they 
should have contacted Utah. 
Mr. Curtis argued that pursuant to Coppedge, the Utah Court 
should have contacted the Mississippi Court when it realized that 
there was an action pending because the Mississippi Orders had 
been filed in the Utah Court file. Mr. Curtis then argues that • 
because Mrs. Curtis1 Affidavit in Support of an Order to Show 
Cause In Contempt did not specify that she had appeared in a 
hearing in Mississippi that the Commissioner entered the wrong 
recommendation. Mrs. Curtis1 Affidavit was meant to support an 
Order to Show Cause, not to fulfill the requirements of Utah Code 
Ann., § 78-45c-9. Although, the Plaintiff's affidavit does not 
specify that she attended the proceeding, the Commissioner was 
informed verbally at the Order to Show Cause of the specific 
proceedings as they occurred in Mississippi. Opposing Counsel 
was present and had the opportunity to put forth any additional 
information that the Court was not aware of. When the 
Commissioner made his recommendation he knew of the action in 
Mississippi, of the litigation that took place there, and of the 
current status. The Commissioner determined, based on all of the 
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facts, that because Utah had never relinquished jurisdiction, 
therefore, Utah did not recognize the orders of the Mississippi 
Court. The Plaintiff's affidavit outlined enough facts to give 
the Commissioner notice that another proceeding had been 
initiated in Mississippi. But because Utah had continuing 
jurisdiction that had never been relinquished, Commissioner 
Maetani held that it was the Mississippi Court's responsibility 
to contact the Utah Court. 
In a very recent case, Harris v. Melnick, Md. CtApp, No. 18-
1988, 1/19/89, the court quotes Professor Brigitte M. 
Bodenheimer, who wrote Interstate Custody: Initial Jurisdiction 
and Continuing Jurisdiction Under the UCCJA, 14 Fam. L.Q. 203, 
215 (1981): 
...the rule governing modification jurisdiction are 
markedly different from the rules applicable to initial 
jurisdiction. 
The court goes on to conclude: 
This means that only one state--the state of continuing 
jurisdiction—has power to modify the custody decree. 
Only that state decides whether to decline the exercise 
of its jurisdiction of any particular case. The rule 
is clear and simple. There can be no concurrent 
jurisdiction and no jurisdictional conflict between two 
states. 
According to the Court in Harris, Courts generally give the 
decree rendering state a strong presumption of continuing 
modification jurisdiction until all or almost all connection with 
the parents and child is lost. 
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Appellate Courts are adopting the position that custody 
should be determined by the home state as set forth in the UCCJA. 
Prior to another state modifying that decree, the state of 
original jurisdiction must relinquish its jurisdiction. In the 
Curtis case, the Utah court had not relinquished its 
jurisdiction, regardless of whether the Plaintiff appeared 
personally in the proceedings in Mississippi or not. Based on 
the analysis of the Harris case, as well as the other case law 
previously cited, Utah had not relinquished jurisdiction over the 
Curtis children at the time the Mississippi Orders were entered. 
B. Mississippi's own Court agreed that it did not have 
proper jurisdiction when the Petition to Modify was filed in 
February of 1988. 
On August 9, 1988, the Mississippi Court Dismissed the 
Petition to Modify the Foreign Decree, finding that under the 
UCCJA both states could make claim to jurisdiction, but the PKPA 
was determinative, and only Utah met both of the standards under 
that act. At that time, Mrs. Curtis had already entered her 
personal appearance, yet this was not enough for the Mississippi 
Court to determine that jurisdiction should remain in 
Mississippi. By the Court's own ruling, Mississippi did not have 
proper jurisdiction, regardless of how it could be acquired 
(emergency circumstances, best interests, consent, etc.) 
Therefore, the Mississippi Court never entered a finding that it 
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took jurisdiction pursuant to the emergency circumstances 
provision of the UCCJA. 
C. The Mississippi trial court used the Relief from 
Domestic Abuse Statute to keep the children in the state of 
Mississippi through a protective order in effect for one year. 
The Mississippi trial court in effect, circumvented the 
entire UCCJA, by entering a one year protective order keeping the 
children in the state of Mississippi. After the children had 
been in the state for over six months, the UCCJA could be applied 
and a permanent Petition to Modify Custody could be awarded. 
Allowing the Mississippi Court to use the state protective order 
statute to supercede the UCCJA is a violation of the purpose of 
the UCCJA, and undermines its entire purpose. This policy 
increases the potential for conflict with other court orders and' 
hinders cooperation with courts of other states. 
D. It violates the purposes of the UCCJA to uphold and 
enforce the Mississippi Order and to allow Mississippi to claim 
jurisdiction under the home state provision of the UCCJA for the 
Petition to Modify filed in November of 1988 after detaining the 
children in the State through the use of the state protective 
order statute. 
In Utah Code Ann., § 78-45c-l the purposes of the adoption 
of the UCCJA are enumerated. They include: (a) avoid 
jurisdiction competition and conflict ... which have resulted in 
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shifting of children from state to state. ...; (b) promote 
cooperation with the courts....; (c) assure that litigation ... 
take place ... in the state with which the child and his family 
have the closest connection ....; (d) discourage continuing 
controversies....; (e) deter abductions and other unilateral 
removals of children undertaken to obtain custody awards; (f) 
avoid relitigation of custody decisions....; (g) facilitate the 
enforcement of custody decrees of other states; (h) promote and 
expand the exchange of information....; (i) to make uniform the 
law of those states which enact it. 
The purposes for adopting the UCCJA are important to the 
Curtis case because they explain the intent of the drafters in 
how the procedure should apply in a contest of jurisdiction case. 
Mr. Curtis did take the children on a regularly scheduled 
visitation. He had previously made arrangements with Mrs. Curtis 
for an extended weekend visitation. After getting the children 
in the car his parting words to her were to the effect that she 
'would get her Valentines' present.1 Mrs. Curtis knew after that 
statement that Mr. Curtis was going to try to do something. Mrs. 
Curtis called his landlord and learned that he had cleared out 
the residence. Mrs. Curtis contacted the police and was told 
that there was nothing they could do until his visitation period 
was over with. 
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It was not until Mrs. Curtis was mailed copies of the papers 
from Mississippi that she knew where Mr. Curtis had taken the 
children. 
Mr. Curtis alleges that he had every intention of returning 
the children after the weekend, and illustrates this by saying 
that he purchased round trip tickets, but when he "learned of the 
serious nature of the abuse" he felt the need to file for 
immediate relief. Never does Mr. Curtis explain why he did not 
tell Mrs. Curtis that he was taking the children out of the state 
during the visitation, nor does he explain why, if he was going 
to come back on his round trip tickets, he cleaned out his 
residence in Utah. 
The purpose of the adoption of the UCCJA is to prevent the 
removing of children from one jurisdiction to another. Mr. 
Curtis argues that he did not take the children illegally. 
Perhaps, because of the way that Mr. Curtis arranged the move to 
Mississippi he might not be convicted of a criminal offense, 
although the Utah trial court did find that not returning the 
children was a violation of the Decree of Divorce. Mr. Curtis 
has never been forced to answer how the circumstances were 
conveniently set up. In Utah homestudies had been completed 
where there had been a visit to both homes, psychological 
evaluations completed on both parties and the children had been 
interviewed. In the home evaluation conducted by the Scott 
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County Social Services Department in Mississippi, a social worker 
went to the home and spoke with the children. Even with that 
minimal amount of evaluating, the social worker reported that 
three of the children reported to the worker that they wanted to 
live with their mother. The younger children state that their 
father is gone to work before they get up, and he returns home 
after they are in bed, six days a week. Yet Mrs. Curtis was not 
even consulted in the course of the Mississippi home evaluation. 
In a later evaluation by the same social worker, the oldest 
daughter told her that they had been told what to say by their 
father. The Social Worker later testified that she had no reason 
to disbelieve the daughters last version of the facts. There was 
not the same type of evidence available in Mississippi as there 
was in Utah. 
All of the alleged acts of negligence and abuse by Mrs. 
Curtis would have occurred in the State of Utah, if they had 
taken place. Yet there has never, even as of yet, been an 
investigation of Mrs. Curtis' home in Utah. There has never been 
so much as a referral made to the Division of Family Services in 
Utah. 
To allow the non-custodial parent to take the children 
legally on a visitation, go to another state and file under their 
abuse statute, when the acts complained of occured in the 
original state, violates the policy and purposes of the UCCJA. 
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At the time Mr. Curtis took the children to Mississippi, he 
did not even have residency there. Through the provisions of the 
Protection from Domestic Abuse Law, Mr. Curtis was allowed to get 
the protective order and therefore, a custody order. It has 
never been explained why Mr. Curtis could not have gone back to 
Utah, on his round trip tickets, and filed for a protective order 
on the children and filed for a modification in Utah if the abuse 
the children told him about was so severe. The evidence of the 
abuse would have been located in Utah, since the incidence 
allegedly took place there. 
Mr. Curtis violated the purpose of subsection (a) by 
shifting the children from Utah to Mississippi, and causing a 
jurisdictional conflict that could easily have been avoided. 
At the time Mr. Curtis got the Ex Parte Protective Order, he 
and the children had been in Mississippi for four days. Moving 
the children to Mississippi was a blatant violation of the 
purpose listed in subsection (c), "assure that litigation ... 
take place ... in the state with which the child and his family 
have the closest connection....;" Mississippi contained no 
evidence of the abuse that was alleged to have occurred in Utah. 
Utah assuredly had the closest connection with the family at this 
point and could have provided the best evidence that the abuse 
did or did not occur. In fact, psychological evaluations had 
been completed by both Mr. and Mrs. Curtis during the course of 
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the divorce proceedings. The psychologists could have been 
available to testify in an abuse proceeding if it had been 
conducted in Utah. The evaluations explained that Mr. Curtis had 
scores which are common to one who takes the law into his own 
hands. In fact, the evaluators later reconsidered their initial 
determination that Mr. Curtis could possibly have custody of the 
older children because a later violent incident. The evidence 
that is in Utah would have been very important in making an 
accurate determination on the issues of abuse. 
Subsection (d) states that the purpose is to discourage 
continuing controversies over child custody. If Mississippi were 
allowed to take jurisdiction, it would set a dangerous precedent 
contrary to the intent of the UCCJA. Arguably there would be 
nothing to stop Mrs. Curtis from exercising visitation with the 
children in Mississippi, taking them to Florida (or any other 
state), filing for a protective order based on events alleged to 
have taken place in Mississippi and then getting an order from 
the Florida court. The procedure of taking the children from 
state to state could go on indefinitely. 
Mr. Curtis has alleged that he removed the children legally, 
but subsection (e) addresses the unilateral removal of the 
children undertaken to obtain custody awards. It has never been 
disputed that this was a unilateral removal, and the removal 
would constitute a violation of the purposes of the Act. 
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It is important to keep in mind that the Utah Decree of 
Divorce was 10 weeks old when Mr. Curtis took the children to 
Mississippi. Mr. Curtis holds strongly to the position that 
because the Mississippi Court entered findings after three days 
of hearing on the protective order, that he was justified in 
removing the children. It is not hard to imagine how he would be 
able to get these findings when all of Mrs. Curtis evidence would 
obviously be in Utah, since that is where the alleged instances 
occurred and all of the witnesses would be located. Mrs. Curtis' 
counsel in Mississippi was prepared to argue jurisdiction, but 
with the short amount of time between Mrs. Curtis1 receiving 
notice, securing counsel and getting to Mississippi, she had 
little time and resources to refute the testimony that Mr. Curtis 
had prepared. For this very reason, the drafters of the UCCJA 
determined one of the purposes is to have the case heard in the 
state with the "closest connection and where significant 
evidence" to the family is located. The importance of ruling in 
conformity with this purpose was illustrated in the recent case 
In the interest of W. D. v. Drake, 103 Utah Adv. Rep. 26, (1989). 
The court ruled that "In the instant case, substantial 
information concerning the parents' abilities and past history 
was in California. The mother had only recently come to Utah, 
but had lived for years in California." Id. at 28. Because the 
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best information, and the substantial information concerning the 
Curtis family was in Utah, jurisdiction should be in Utah. 
II. MRS. CURTIS' PERSONAL APPEARANCE IN MISSISSIPPI DOES NOT 
ESTABLISH PROPER JURISDICTION UNDER THE UCCJA 
A. Personal appearance in a custody case is not the 
standard for determining proper jurisdiction under the UCCJA. 
Personal appearance in litigation is not the standard that 
creates appropriate jurisdiction under the UCCJA. The Court 
ruled that because Mrs. Curtis personally appeared in the 
proceeding in Mississippi that total jurisdiction would transfer 
to Mississippi. This has not been the recent trend of other 
courts to address this same issue. See Rawlings discussed above. 
Mrs. Curtis did not give up her right to challenge the 
appropriate jurisdiction under the UCCJA or PKPA. 
The Plaintiff initially tried to have the action dismissed 
for lack of jurisdiction, but when it became apparent that 
Mississippi would hear the case with or without Mrs. Curtis, she 
did personally appear. Other cases have held that personal 
appearance does not effect subject matter jurisdiction covered by 
the UCCJA. In Mosely v. Huffman, 481 So.2d 231 (Miss., 1985) a 
child's grandparents abducted the child from Mississippi and took 
her to Arizona. The child resided in Arizona for over two years 
before the child's parents found her. The grandparents initiated 
an action in Arizona which the parents personally appeared in. 
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The Supreme Court of Mississippi upheld the lower court that 
ruled: 
For the authorities to take the position and now tell 
this mother, "You cannot have the custody of your 
child," because of a hypertechnicality, when the 
authorities provided little or no assistance in 
locating the child from the outset would, in the 
opinion of this Court, be an injustice. To now rule 
that the state of residence of the grandmother is the 
state of jurisdiction would be to reward the initiator 
of a wrong. Neither the grandmother, by abducting the 
child, nor the mother, upon submitting herself to the 
Arizona court can defeat the rights of this child and 
deprive or relieve this court of its constitutional 
duty. Original jurisdiction was, is, and remains 
vested in the Chancery Court of the State of 
Mississippi. Id. at 238. 
In Mosley the grandparents blatantly abducted the child. 
They arranged with the parents to take the child on a visit and 
then did not return. Mr. Curtis did the same thing on his 
visitation, except that he "legitimized" it by getting a 
protective order with only a matter of days notice to Mrs. Curtis 
and when the alleged acts occurred in another state. 
In re Marriage of Hopson, 110 Cal. App.3d 884, 168 Cal.Rptr. 
345 (Cal. Ct.App 1980) dealt with a case where a father 
wrongfully took his two children from California to Tennessee, 
although it was not certain that in doing so he violated a 
custody decree, and initiated proceedings in Tennessee to modify 
the Arizona custody decree. Seventeen months later a final 
judgment awarding custody to the father was entered. Thereafter, 
the mother sought enforcement of the Arizona custody order in 
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California. The father argued that the mother appeared 
personally in Tennessee to defend. The trial court sustained the 
father and dismissed the petition. The California Court of 
Appeals reversed and observed that the res judicata effect of a. 
custody decree was dependent upon the court having personal and 
subject matter jurisdiction, and the exclusive method of 
determining subject matter jurisdiction in child custody cases 
was the UCCJA, which superseded any contrary decisional and 
statutory law. The court in Hopson then observed: "There is no 
provision in the act for jurisdiction to be established by reason 
of the presence of the parties or by stipulation or consent." Id 
at 350-351. 
The court npted that the UCCJA distinguishes illegal removal 
or detention from all other custody violations, but the court 
stated: Giving recognition to the Tennessee decree condones the 
father's behavior and encourages unlawful abduction; it invites 
parental manipulation and deceit, while undermining the basic 
parent-child relationship." The Mississippi ruling certainly 
invites "parental manipulation and deceit." 
Mrs. Curtis' personal appearance in Mississippi is not the 
determinative factor in deciding proper jurisdiction. 
Jurisdiction must be determined according to the UCCJA. 
It is contrary to the policy and purposes of the Uniform 
Child Custody Jurisdiction Act to assume that because a state has 
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personal jurisdiction that the state may then automatically 
assume jurisdiction under the UCCJA. 
One of the purposes of the UCCJA is to set uniform standards 
for determining the best state to hear the custody issues—no 
where does it indicate that personal appearance waives the 
Court's responsibility to look at the bases of jurisdiction. 
III. WHEN TWO STATES HAVE CONFLICTING CLAIMS TO CUSTODY, THE 
PARENTAL KIDNAPPING PREVENTION ACT CONTROLS, AND UNDER ITS TERMS 
UTAH IS THE PROPER FORUM 
A. By the terms of the PKPA it controls in cases of two 
states with conflicting claims. 
In the August 9, 1988, Order from the Mississippi Court, the 
Mississippi court did rule that where both states had claims to 
jurisdiction under the UCCJA, their claim must yield to a Federal 
Act of Congress, namely the Parental Kidnapping Prevention Act of 
1980, 28 U.S.C.A., § 1738A. This statute provides: 
(f) A court of a State may modify a determination of 
the custody of the same child made by a court of 
another State, if--
(1) it has jurisdiction to make such a child 
custody determination, and 
(2) the court of the other State no longer has 
jurisdiction, or it has declined to exercise such 
jurisdiction to modify such determination. 
Utah had not ever relinquished jurisdiction prior to the 
entry of any of the Mississippi orders. But more importantly, 
where two states have claim to jurisdiction, the PKPA, a Federal 
Act, requires that a modification can only occur where the 
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modifying state has jurisdiction and the Court of the prior state 
no longer has jurisdiction or has declined to exercise it. It is 
clear that at least until Judge Park contacted Mississippi's 
judge, Utah had not ever relinquished jurisdiction. All of the 
orders currently standing in Mississippi were entered prior to 
that time. Judge Park should not have relinquished jurisdiction. 
At any given point, prior to Mississippi entering an order, 
Mississippi could not meet both prongs of the PKPA standard. 
CONCLUSION AND STATEMENT OF THE RELIEF SOUGHT 
A reversal of the trial court's decision to dismiss Mrs. 
Curtis' Order to Show Cause in Contempt and a reversal of the 
Order to Enforce the Mississippi Order. More specifically, Mrs. 
Curtis seeks the following: 
1. A determination that Mississippi, did not have proper 
jurisdiction under the UCCJA. 
2. A determination that Mrs. Curtis' personal appearance in 
Mississippi did not establish proper jurisdiction under the 
UCCJA. 
3. A determination that Utah was and is the proper 
jurisdiction to modify the Decree of Divorce. 
4. A determination that the PKPA controls when two states 
have conflicting claims to custody, and only Utah meets both 
prongs of the test. 
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5, A reversal of the trial court's order to dismiss the 
Order to Show Cause in Contempt, and a reinstatement of the 
Domestic Commissioner's Order that Mrs, Curtis should retain 
custody, and that visitation by Mr, Curtis should be supervised. 
6. An award of attorney's fees and costs to Mrs. Curtis to 
be paid by Mr. Curtis for Mrs. Curtis' attorney's benefit. 
Plaintiff does not have the financial resources to pay her 
attorney's fees and costs in this appeal, yet she has been forced 
to incur such fees and costs to pursue her rights in this matter. 
DATED this /Q day of August, 1989. 
.j/jJMtt. J M X 
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ADDENDUM 
Utah Code Ann., § 78-45c-l, et seq. (Uniform Child Custody 
Jurisdiction Act, (UCCJA). 
28 USCS, § 1738A (Parental Kidnapping Prevention Act, 
PKPA). 
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CHAPTER 45b 
PUBLIC SUPPORT OF CHILDREN 
(Repealed by Laws 1985, ch. 10, § 2; 1987, ch. 
161, § 314; 1988, ch. 1, § 407.) 
78-45b-l to 78-45b-25. Repealed. 
CHAPTER 45c 
UNIFORM CHILD CUSTODY JURISDICTION 
Section 
78-45c-l. Purposes — Construction. 
78-45c-2. Definitions. 
78-45c-3. Bases of jurisdiction in this state. 
78-45c-4. Persons to be notified and heard. 
78-45c-5. Service of notice outside state — Proof of 
service — Submission to jurisdiction. 
78-45c-6. Proceedings pending elsewhere — Juris-
i diction not exercised — Inquiry to 
other state — Information exchange 
— Stay of proceeding on notice of an-
other proceeding. 
78-45c-7. Declining jurisdiction on finding of in-
convenient forum — Factors in deter-
mination — Communication with 
other court — Awarding costs. 
78-45c-8. Misconduct of petitioner as basis for re-
fusing jurisdiction — Notice to an-
other jurisdiction — Ordering peti-
tioner to appear in other court or to 
return child — Awarding costs. 
7£-45c-9. Information as to custody of child and 
litigation concerning required in 
pleadings — Verification — Continu-
ing duty to inform court. 
78-45c-10. Joinder of persons having custody or 
claiming custody or visitation rights. 
78-45c-ll. Ordering party to appear — Enforce-
ment — Out-of-state party — Travel 
and other expenses. 
78-45c-12. Parties bound by custody decree — Con-
clusive unless modified. 
78-45c-13. Recognition and enforcement of foreign 
decrees. 
78-45c-14. Modification of foreign decree — Prereq-
uisites — Factors considered. 
78-45c-15. Filing foreign decree — Effect — En-
forcement — Award of expenses. 
78-45c-16. Registry maintained by clerk of court — 
Documents entered. 
Section 
78-45c-17. Certified copies of decrees furnished by 
clerk of court. 
78-45c-18. Taking testimony of persons in other 
states. 
78-45c-19. Request to court of another state to take 
evidence, to make studies or to order 
appearance of party — Payment of 
costs. 
78-45c-20. Taking evidence for use in court of an-
other state — Ordering appearance in 
another state — Costs — Enforce^ 
ment. 
78-45c-21. Preservation of records of proceedings — 
Furnishing copies to other state 
courts. 
78-45c-22. Requesting court records from another 
state. 
78-45c-23. Foreign countries — Application of gen-
eral policies. 
78-45c-24. Priority on court calendar. 
78-45c-25. Notices — Orders to appear — Manner 
of service. 
78-45c-26. Short title. 
78-45c-l. Purposes — Construction. 
(1) The general purposes of this act are to: 
(a) avoid jurisdiction competition and conflict 
with courts of other states in matters of child 
custody which have in the past resulted in the 
shifting of children from state to state with 
harmful effects on their well-being; 
(b) promote cooperation with the courts of 
other states to the end that a custody decree is 
rendered in that state which can best decide the 
case in the interest of the child; 
(c) assure that litigation concerning the cus-
tody of a child take place ordinarily in the state 
with which the child and his family have the 
closest connection and where significant evidence 
concerning his care, protection, training, arid 
personal relationships is most readily available, 
and that courts of this state decline the exercise 
of jurisdiction when the child and his family have 
a closer connection with another state; 
(d) discourage continuing controversies over 
child custody in the interest of greater stability 
of home environment and of secure family rela-
tionships for the child; 
(e) deter abductions and other unilateral re-
movals of children undertaken to obtain custody 
awards; 
(0 avoid relitigation of custody decisions of 
other states in this state insofar as feasible; 
(g) facilitate the enforcement of custody de-
crees of other states; 
(h) promote and expand the exchange of infor-
mation and other forms of mutual assistance be-
tween the courts of this state and those of other 
states concerned with the same child; and 
(i) to make uniform the law of those states 
which enact it. 
(2) This title shall be construed to promote the gen-
eral purposes stated in this section. i960 
78-45c-2. Definitions. 
As used in this act: 
(1) "Contestant" means a person, including a 
parent, who claims a right to custody or visita-
tion rights with respect to a child; 
(2) "Custody determination" means a court de-
cision and court orders and instructions provid-
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ing for the custody of a child, including visitation 
rights; it does not include a decision relating to 
child support or any other monetary obligation of 
any person; 
(3) "Custody proceeding" includes proceedings 
in which a custody determination is one of sev-
eral issues, such as an action for dissolution of 
marriage, or legal separation, and includes child 
neglect and dependency proceedings; 
(4) "Decree" or "custody decree" means a cus-
tody determination contained in a judicial decree 
or order made in a custody proceeding, and in-
cludes an initial decree and a modification de-
cree; 
(5) "Home state" means the state in which the 
child immediately preceding the time involved 
lived with his parents, a parent, or a person act-
ing as parent, for at least six consecutive months, 
and in the case of a child less than six months old 
the state in which the child lived from birth with 
any of the persons mentioned. Periods of tempo-
rary absence of any of the named persons are 
counted as part of the six-month or other period; 
(6) "Initial decree" means the first custody de-
cree concerning a particular child; 
(7) "Modification decree" means a custody de-
cree which modifies or replaces a prior decree, 
whether made by the court which rendered the 
prior decree or by another court; 
(8) "Physical custody" means actual possession 
and control of a child; 
(9) "Person acting as parent" means a person, 
other than a parent, who has physical custody of 
a child and who has either been awarded custody 
by the court or claims a right to custody; and 
(10) "State" means any state, territory or pos-
session of the United States, the Commonwealth 
of Puerto Rico, and the District of Columbia. 
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78-45c-3. Bases of jurisdiction in this state. 
( D A court of this state which is competent to de-
cide child custody matters has jurisdiction to make a 
child custody determination by initial or modification 
decree if the conditions as set forth in any of the fol-
lowing paragraphs are met: 
(a) This state (i) is the home state of the child 
at the time of commencement of the proceeding, 
or (ii) had been the child's home state within six 
months before commencement of the proceeding 
and the child is absent from this state because of 
his removal or retention by a person claiming his 
custody or for other reasons, and a parent or per-
son acting as parent continues to live in this 
state; 
(b) It is in the best interest of the child that a 
court of this state assume jurisdiction because (i) 
the child and his parents, or the child and at 
least one contestant, have a significant connec-
tion with this state, and (ii) there is available in 
this state substantial evidence concerning the 
child's present or future care, protection, train-
ing, and personal relationships; 
(c) The child is physically present in this state 
and (i) the child has been abandoned or (ii) it is 
necessary in an emergency to protect the child 
because he has been subjected to or threatened 
with mistreatment or abuse or is otherwise ne-
glected or dependent; or 
(d) (i) It appears that no other state would 
have jurisdiction under prerequisites substan-
tially in accordance with Paragraphs 'a), ib), or 
(c), or another state has declined to exercise juris-
diction on the ground that this state is the more 
appropriate forum to determine the custody of 
the child, and (ii) it is in the best interest of the 
child that this court assume jurisdiction. 
(2) Except under Paragraphs (c) and (d) of Subsec-
tion (1), physical presence in this state of the child, or 
of the child and one of the contestants, is not alone 
sufficient to confer jurisdiction on a court of this state 
to make a child custody determination. 
(3) Physical presence of the child, while desirable, 
is not a prerequisite for jurisdiction to determine his 
custody. 1980 
78-45c-4. P e r s o n s to be notified and heard. 
Before making a decree under this act, reasonable 
notice and opportunity to be heard shall be given to 
the contestants, any parent whose parental rights 
have not been previously terminated, and any person 
who has physical custody of the child. If any of these 
persons is outside this state, notice and opportunity 
to be heard shall be given pursuant to Section 
78-45c-5. 1980 
78-45c-5. Service of notice outside state — Proof 
of service — Submission to jurisdic-
tion. 
(1) Notice required for the exercise of jurisdiction 
over a person outside this state shall be given in a 
manner reasonably calculated to give actual notice, 
and may be made in any of the following ways: 
(a) by personal delivery outside this state in 
the manner prescribed for service of process 
within this state; 
(b) in the manner prescribed by the law of the 
place in which the service is made for service of 
process in that place in an action in any of its 
courts of general jurisdiction; 
(c) by any form of mail addressed to the person 
to be served and requesting a receipt; or 
(d) as directed by the court (including publica-
tion, if other means of notification are ineffec-
tive). 
(2) Notice under this section shall be served, 
mailed, delivered, or last published at least 10 days 
before any hearing in this state. 
(3) Proof of service outside this state may be made 
by affidavit of the individual who made the service, or 
in the manner prescribed by the law of this state, the 
order pursuant to which the service is made, or the 
law of the place in which the service is made. If ser-
vice is made by mail, proof may be a receipt signed by 
the addressee or other evidence of delivery to the ad-
dressee. 
(4) Notice is not required if a person submits to the 
jurisdiction of the court. 1980 
78-45c-6. Proceedings pending elsewhere — Ju-
risdiction not exercised — Inquiry to 
other state — Information exchange — 
Stay of proceeding on notice of an-
other proceeding. 
( D A court of this state shall not exercise its juris-
diction under this act if at the time of filing the peti-
tion a proceeding concerning the custody of the child 
was pending in a court of another state exercising 
jurisdiction substantially in conformity with this act, 
unless the proceeding is stayed by the court of the 
other state because this state is a more appropriate 
forum or for other reasons. 
(2) Before hearing the petition in a custody pro-
ceeding the court shall examine the pleadings and 
other information supplied by the parties under Sec-
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tion 78-45c-10 and shall consult the child custody reg-
istry established under Section 78-45c-16 concerning 
the pendency of proceedings with respect to the child 
in other states. If the court has reason to believe that 
proceedings may be pending in another state it shall 
direct an inquiry to the state court administrator or 
other appropriate official of the other state. 
(3) If the court is informed during the course of the 
proceeding that a proceeding concerning the custody 
of the child was pending in another state before the 
court assumed jurisdiction it shall stay the proceed-
ing and communicate with the court in which the 
other proceeding is pending to the end that the issue 
may be litigated in the more appropriate forum and 
that information be exchanged in accordance with 
Sections 78-45c-19 through 78-45c-22. If a court of 
this state has made a custody decree before being 
informed of a pending proceeding in a court of an-
other state it shall immediately inform that court of 
the fact. If the court is informed that a proceeding 
was commenced in another state after it assumed ju-
risdiction it shall likewise inform the other court to 
the end that the issues may be litigated in the more 
appropriate forum. 1980 
78-45c-7. Declining jurisdiction on finding of in-
convenient forum — Factors in deter-
mination — Communication with other 
court — Awarding costs. 
(1) A court which has jurisdiction under this act to 
make an initial or modification decree may decline to 
exercise its jurisdiction any time before making a de-
cree if it finds that it is an inconvenient forum to 
make a custody determination under the circum-
stances of the case and that a court of another state is 
a more appropriate forum. 
(2) A finding of inconvenient forum may be made 
upon the court's own motion or upon motion of a 
party or a guardian ad litem or other representative 
of the child. 
(3) In determining if it is an inconvenient forum, 
the court shall consider if it is in the interest of the 
child that another state assume jurisdiction. For this 
purpose it may take into account the following fac-
tors, among others: 
(a) if another state is or recently was the 
child's home state; 
(b) if another state has a closer connection 
with the child and his family or with the child 
and one or more of the contestants; 
(c) if substantial evidence concerning the 
child's present or future care, protection, train-
ing, and personal relationships is more readily 
available in another state; 
(d) if the parties have agreed on another forum 
which is no less appropriate; and 
(e) if the exercise of jurisdiction by a court of 
this state would contravene any of the purposes 
stated in Section 78-45c-l. 
(4) Before determining whether to decline or retain 
jurisdiction the court may communicate with a court 
of another state and exchange information pertinent 
to the assumption of jurisdiction by either court with 
a view to assuring that jurisdiction will be exercised 
by the more appropriate court and that a forum will 
be available to the parties. 
(5) If the court finds that it is an inconvenient 
forum and that a court of another state is a more 
appropriate forum, it may dismiss the proceedings, or 
it may stay the proceedings upon condition that a 
custody proceeding be promptly commenced in an-
other named state or upon any other conditions which 
may be just and proper, including the condition that a 
moving party stipulate his consent and submission to 
the jurisdiction of the other forum. 
(6) The court may decline to exercise its jurisdic-
tion under this act if a custody determination is inci-
dental to an action for divorce or another proceeding 
while retaining jurisdiction over the divorce or other 
proceeding. 
(7) If it appears to the court that it is clearly an 
inappropriate forum it may require the party who 
commenced the proceedings to pay, in addition to the 
costs of the proceedings in this state, necessary travel 
and other expenses, including attorney's fees, in-
curred by other parties or their witnesses. Payment is 
to be made to the clerk of the court for remittance to 
the proper party. 
(8) Upon dismissal or stay of proceedings under 
this section the court shall inform the court found to 
be the more appropriate forum of this fact, or if the 
court which would have jurisdiction in the other state 
is not certainly known, shall transmit the informa-
tion to the court administrator or other appropriate 
official for forwarding to the appropriate court. 
(9) Any communication received from another 
state informing this state of a finding of inconvenient 
forum because a court of this state is the more appro-
priate forum shall be filed in the custody registry of 
the appropriate court. Upon assuming jurisdiction 
the court of this state shall inform the original court 
of this fact. 1980 
78-45c-8. Misconduct of petitioner as basis for 
refusing jurisdiction — Notice to an-
other jurisdiction — Ordering peti-
tioner to appear in other court or to 
return child — Awarding costs. 
(1) If the petitioner for an initial decree has wrong-
fully taken the child from another state or has en-
gaged in similar reprehensible conduct the court may 
decline to exercise jurisdiction for purposes of adjudi-
cation of custody if this is just and proper under the 
circumstances. 
(2) Unless required in the interest of the child, the 
court shall not exercise its jurisdiction to modify a 
custody decree of another state if the petitioner, with-
out consent of the person entitled to custody has im-
properly removed the child from the physical custody 
of the person entitled to custody or has improperly 
retained the child after a visit or other temporary 
relinquishment of physical custody. If the petitioner 
has violated any other provision of a custody decree of 
another state the court may decline to exercise its 
jurisdiction if this is just and proper under the cir-
cumstances. 
(3) Where the court declines to exercise jurisdic-
tion upon petition for an initial custody decree pursu-
ant to Subsection (1), the court shall notify the parent 
or other appropriate person and the prosecuting at-
torney of the appropriate jurisdiction in the other 
state. If a request to that effect is received from the 
other state, the court shall order the petitioner to 
appear with the child in a custody proceeding insti-
tuted in the other state in accordance with Section 
78-45c-20. If no such request is made within a reason-
able time after such notification, the court may enter-
tain a petition to determine custody by the petitioner 
if it has jurisdiction pursuant to Section 78-45c-2. 
(4) Where the court refuses to assume jurisdiction 
to modify the custody decree of another state pursu-
ant to Subsection (2) or pursuant to Section 
78-45c-14, the court shall notify the person who has 
legal custody under the decree of the other state and 
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the prosecuting attorney of the appropriate jurisdic-
tion in the other state and may order the petitioner to 
return the child to the person who has legal custody. 
If it appears that the order will be ineffective and the 
legal custodian is ready to receive the child within a 
period of a few days, the court may place the child in 
a foster care home for such period, pending return of 
the child to the legal custodian. At the same time, the 
court shall advise the petitioner that any petition for 
modification of custody must be directed to the appro-
priate court of the other state which has continuing 
jurisdiction, or, in the event that that court declines 
jurisdiction, to a court in a state which has jurisdic-
tion pursuant to Section 78-45c-3. 
(5) In appropriate cases a court dismissing a peti-
tion under this section may charge the petitioner 
with necessary travel and other expenses, including 
attorney's fees and the cost of returning the child to 
another state. 1980 
78-45c-9. Information as to custody of child and 
litigation concerning required in 
pleadings — Verification — Continu-
ing duty to inform court. 
(1) Every party in a custody proceeding in his first 
pleading or in an affidavit attached to that pleading 
shall give information under oath as to the child's 
present address, the places where the child has lived 
within the last five years, and the names and present 
addresses of the persons with whom the child has 
lived during that period. In this pleading or affidavit 
every party shall further declare under oath as to 
each of the following whether: 
(a) he has participated, as a party, witness, or 
in any other capacity, in any other litigation con-
cerning the custody of the same child in this or 
any other state; 
(b) he has information of any custody proceed-
ing concerning the child pending in a court of 
this or any other state; and 
(c) he knows of any person not a party to the 
proceedings who has physical custody of the child 
or claims to have custody or visitation rights 
with respect to the child. 
(2) If the declaration as to any of the above items is 
in the affirmative the declarant shall give additional 
information under oath as required by the court. The 
court may examine the parties under oath as to de-
tails of the information furnished and as to other 
matters pertinent to the court's jurisdiction and the 
disposition of the case. 
(3) Each party has a continuing duty to inform the 
court of any custody proceeding concerning the child 
in this or any other s tate of which he obtained infor-
mation during this proceeding. 1980 
78-45c-10. Jo inder of persons having custody or 
claiming custody or visitation rights. 
If the court learns from information furnished by 
the parties pursuant to Section 78-45c-9 or from other 
sources that a person not a party to the custody pro-
ceeding has physical custody of the child or claims to 
have custody or visitation r ights with respect to the 
child, it shall order tha t person to be joined as a party 
and to be duly notified of the pendency of the proceed-
ing and of his joinder as a party. If the person joined 
as a party is outside this s tate he shall be served with 
process or otherwise notified in accordance with Sec-
tion 78-45c-5. 1980 
78-45c-l l . Ordering party to appear — Enforce-
ment — Out-of-state party — Travel 
and other expenses. 
(1) The court may order any party to the proceed-
ing who is in this state to appear personally before 
the court. If that party has physical custody of the 
child the court may order that he appear personally 
with the child. If the party who is ordered to appear 
with the child cannot be served or fails to obey the 
order, or it appears the order will be ineffective, the 
court may issue a warrant of arrest against such 
party to secure his appearance with the child. 
(2) If a party to the proceeding whose presence is 
desired by the court is outside this state with or with-
out the child the court may order that the notice 
given under Section 78-45c-5 include a statement di-
recting that party to appear personally with or with-
out the child and declaring that failure to appear may 
result in a decision adverse to that party. 
(3) If a party to the proceeding who is outside this 
s tate is directed to appear under Subsection (2) or 
desires to appear personally before the court with or 
without the child, the court may require another 
party to pay to the clerk of the court travel and other 
necessary expenses of the party so appearing and of 
the child if this is jus t and proper under the circum-
stances. 1980 
78-45c-12. Parties bound by custody decree — 
Conclusive unless modified. 
A custody decree rendered by a court of this state 
which had jurisdiction under Section 78-45c-3, binds 
all parties who have been served in this state or noti-
fied in accordance with Section 78-45c-5 or who have 
submitted to the jurisdiction of the court, and who 
have been given an opportunity to be heard. As to 
these parties the custody decree is conclusive as to all 
issues of law and fact decided and as to the custody 
determination made unless and until that determina-
tion is modified pursuant to law, including the provi-
sions of this act. 1980 
78-45c-13. Recognition and enforcement of for-
eign decrees. 
The courts of this state shall recognize and enforce 
an initial or modification decree of a court of another 
state which had assumed jurisdiction under statutory 
provisions substantially in accordance with this act 
or which was made under factual circumstances 
meeting the jurisdictional standards of the act, so 
long as this decree has not been modified in accor-
dance with jurisdictional standards substantially 
similar to those of this act. . 1980 
78-45c-14. Modification of foreign decree — 
Prerequisites — Factors considered. 
(1) If a court of another state has made a custody 
decree, a court of this state shall not modify that de-
cree unless (a) it appears to the court of this state that 
the court which rendered the decree does not now 
have jurisdiction under jurisdictional prerequisites 
substantially in accordance with this act or has de-
clined to assume jurisdiction to modify the decree and 
(b) the court of this state has jurisdiction. 
(2) If a court of th is s ta te is authorized under Sub-
section (1) and Section 78-45c-8 to modify a custody 
decree of another s tate it shall give due consideration 
to the transcript of the record and other documents of 
all previous proceedings submit ted to it in accordance 
with Section 78-45c-22. 1980 
78-45c-15. Filing foreign decree —- Effect — En-
forcement — A w a r d of expenses . 
(1) A certified copy of a custody decree of another 
state may be filed in the office of the clerk of any 
district court of this state. The clerk shall treat the 
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decree in the same manner as a custody decree of the 
district court of this state. A custody decree so filed 
has the same effect and shall be enforced in like man-
ner as a custody decree rendered by a court of this 
state. 
(2) A person violating a custody decree of another 
state which makes it necessary to enforce the decree 
in this state may be required to pay necessary travel 
and other expenses, including attorney's fees, in-
curred by the party entitled to the custody or his wit-
nesses. 1980 
78-45c-16. Registry maintained by clerk of 
court — Documents entered. 
The clerk of each district court shall maintain a 
registry in which he shall enter all of the following: 
(1) certified copies of custody decrees of other 
states received for filing; 
(2) communications as to the pendency of cus-
tody proceedings in other states; 
(3) communications concerning a finding of in-
convenient forum by a court of another state; and 
(4) o ther communica t ions or documents con-
cerning custody proceedings in another s ta te 
which m a y affect t h e jur isdic t ion of a court of this 
s ta te or t h e disposit ion to be made by it in a cus-
tody proceeding. 1980 
78-45c-17. Certified copies of decrees furnished 
by clerk of court. 
The clerk of a district court of this state, at the 
request of the court of another state or at the request 
of any person who is affected by or has a legitimate 
interest in a custody decree, shall certify and forward 
a copy of the decree to that court or person. i960 
78-45c-18. Taking testimony of persons in other 
states. 
In addition to other procedural devices available to 
a party, any party to the proceeding or a guardian ad 
litem or other representative of the child may adduce 
testimony of witnesses, including parties and the 
child, by deposition or otherwise, in another state. 
The court on its own motion may direct that the testi-
mony of a person be taken in another state and may 
prescribe the manner in which and the terms upon 
which the testimony shall be taken. 1980 
78-45c-19. Request to court of another state to 
take evidence, to make studies or to or-
der appearance of party — Payment of 
costs. 
(1) A court of this state may request the appropri-
ate court of another state to hold a hearing to adduce 
evidence, to order a party to produce or give evidence 
under other procedures of that state, or to have social 
studies made with respect to the custody of a child 
involved in proceedings pending in the court of this 
state; and to forward to the court of this state certi-
fied copies of the transcript of the record of the hear-
ing, the evidence otherwise adduced, or any social 
studies prepared in compliance with the request. The 
cost of the services may be assessed against the par-
ties. 
(2) A court of this state may request the appropri-
ate court of another state to order a party to custody 
proceedings pending in the court of this state to ap-
pear in the proceedings, and if that party has physical 
custody of the child, to appear with the child. The 
request may state that travel and other necessary 
expenses of the party and of the child whose appear-
ance is desired will be assessed against another party 
or will otherwise be paid. 1980 
78-45c-20. Taking evidence for use in court of 
another state — Ordering appearance 
in another state — Costs — Enforce-
ment. 
(1) Upon request of the court of another state the 
courts of this state which are competent to hear cus-
tody matters may order a person in this state to ap-
pear at a hearing to adduce evidence or to produce or 
give evidence under other procedures available in 
this state. A certified copy of the transcript of the 
record of the hearing or the evidence otherwise ad-
duced shall be forwarded by the clerk of the court to 
the requesting court. 
(2) A person within this state may voluntarily give 
his testimony or statement in this state for use in a 
custody proceeding outside this state. 
(3) Upon request of the court of another state a 
competent court of this state may order a person in 
this state to appear alone or with the child in a cus-
tody proceeding in another state. The court may con-
dition compliance with the request upon assurance by 
the other state that travel and other necessary ex-
penses will be advanced or reimbursed. If the person 
who has physical custody of the child cannot be 
served or fails to obey the order, or it appears the 
order will be ineffective, the court may issue a war-
rant of arrest against such person to secure his ap-
pearance with the child in the other state. 1980 
78-45c-21. Preservation of records of proceed-
ings — Furnishing copies to other state 
courts. 
In any custody proceeding in this state the court 
shall preserve the pleadings, orders and decrees, any 
record tha t has been made of its hearings, social stud-
ies, and other pertinent documents until the child 
reaches 18 years o£ age. Upon appropriate request of 
the court of another state the court shall forward to 
the other court certified copies of any or all of such 
documents. 1980 
78-45c-22. R e q u e s t i n g cour t r e co rds from an-
other state. 
If a custody decree has been rendered in another 
state concerning a child involved in a custody pro-
ceeding pending in a court of this state, the court of 
this state upon taking jurisdiction of the case shall 
request of the court of the other state a certified copy 
of the transcript of any court record and other docu-
ments mentioned in Section 78-45c-21. 1980 
78-45c-23. Fo re ign coun t r i e s — Appl ica t ion of 
general policies. 
The general policies of this act extend to the inter-
national area. The provisions of this act relating to 
the recognition and enforcement of custody decrees of 
other states apply to custody decrees and decrees in-
volving legal institutions similar in nature to custody 
rendered by appropriate authorities of other nations 
if reasonable notice and opportunity to be heard were 
given to all affected persons. i960 
78-45c-24. Priority on court calendar. 
Upon the request of a party to a custody proceeding 
which raises a question of existence or exercise of 
jurisdiction under this act the case shall be given cal-
endar priority and handled expeditiously. 1980 
78-45c-25. N o t i c e s — Orders to a p p e a r — Man-
ner of service. 
(1) Whenever the terms of this act impose a duty 
upon the court to notify a party or court of a particu-
lar fact or action, such notification may be accom-
plished by the clerk of the court or a party to the 
action upon order of the court. 
(2) Orders of the court for part ies or persons to ap-
pear before the court in accordance with the te rms of 
th is act shall include legal and sufficient service of 
process in accordance with the Utah Rules of Civil 
Procedure unless otherwise ordered for good cause 
shown. 1980 
78-45c-26. Short title. 
This act may be cited as the "Utah Uniform Child 
Custody Jurisdiction Act." 1980 
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§ 1738A. Fui! faith and credit Riven to child custody determinations 
(a) The appropriate authorities of every State shall enforce according to its terms, and shall not modify 
except as provided in subsection (0 of this section, any child custod) determination made consistently 
with the provisions of this section by a court of another State. 
(b) As used in this section, the term— 
(1) "child** means a person under the age of eighteen; 
(2) "contestant" means a person, including a parent, who claims a right to custody or visitation of a 
child; 
(3) "custody determination** means a judgment, decree, or other order of a court providing for the 
custody or visitation of a child, and includes permanent and temporary orders, and initial orders and 
modifications; 
(4) -home State" means the State in which, immediately preceding the time involved, the child lived 
with his parents, a parent, or a person acting as parent, for at least six consecutive months, and in the 
case of a child less than six months old, the State in which the child lived from birth with any of 
such persons. Periods of temporary absence of any of such persons are counted as pan of the six-
month or other period; 
(5) "modification" and "modify" refer to a custody determination which modifies, replaces, super-
sedes, or otherwise is made subsequent to, a prior custody determination concerning the same child, 
whether made by the same court or not; 
(6) "person acting as a parent" means a person, other than a parent, who has physical custody of a 
child and who has either been awarded custod) by a court or claims a nght to custodv, 
(7) "physical custody" means actual possession and control of a child, and 
(3) "State" means a State of the United States, the District of Columbia, the Commonwealth of 
Puerto Rico, or a territory or possession of the United States. 
(c) A child custody determination made by a coun of a State is consistent with the provisions of this 
section only if— 
(1) such coun has jurisdiction under the law of such State: and 
(2) one of the following conditions is met: 
(A) such State (I) is the home Slate of the child on the date of the commencement of the 
proceeding, or (u) had been the child's home State within six months before the date of the 
commencement of the proceeding and the child is absent from such State because of his removal 
or retention by a contestant or for other reasons, and a contestant continues to live in such State; 
(B)(i) it appears that no other State would have jurisdiction under subparagraph (A), and (n) it is 
in the best interest of the child that a coun of such State assume jurisdiction because (I) the child 
and his parents, or the child and at least one contestant, have a significant connection with such 
State other than mere physical presence in such State, and (II) there is available m such State 
substantial evidence concerning the child's present or future care, protection, training, and 
personal relationships. 
(C) the child is physicall} present in such State and (1) the child has been abandoned, or (u) it is 
necessary in an emergency to protect the child because he has been subjected to or threatened 
with mistreatment or abuse; 
(DXO it appears that no other State would have jurisdiction under subparagraph (A), (B), (Q, or 
(E), or another State has declined to exercise jurisdiction on the ground that the State whose 
jurisdiction is in issue is the more appropriate forum to determine the custody of the child, and 
(u) it is in the best interest of the child that such coun assume jurisdiction, or 
(£) the coun has continuing jurisdiction pursuant to subsection (d) of this section 
(d) The jurisdiction of a coun of a State which has made a child custod} determination consistent!) with 
the provisions of this section continues as long as the requirement of subsection (c)(1) of this section 
continues to be met and such State remains the residence of the child or of any contestant. 
(e) Before a child custody determination is made, reasonable notice and opponunity to be heard shall be 
given to the contestants, any parent whose parental rights have not been previously terminated and any 
person who has physical custody of a child 
(0 A coun of a State may modify a determination of the custody of the same child made by a court of 
another State, if— 
(1) it has jurisdiction to make such a child custody determination, and 
(2) the court of the other State no longer has jurisdiction, or it has declined to exercise such 
jurisdiction to modify such determination 
(g) A court of a State shall not exercise jurisdiction in an) proceeding for a custody determination 
commenced during the pendency of a proceeding in a coun of another State where such coun of that 
other State is exercising junsdiction consistently with the provisions of this section to make a custody 
determination 
(Added Dec 28. 1980, P L. 96-611, § 8(a). 94 Stat 3569 ) 
